strength becomes weak (b/c increasing). This entails the region of PD (blue) also shrinking and that of Trivial (yellow) swelling. It seems quite conservable.
So as to improve the MS be more impressive to the audience, let me suggest couple of things.
#1. As I evaluated above, Fig.3 is quite nice. Yet it would be better, if heat-map of Dg' and Dr' only for PD, CH, SH and TC regions (i.e. except for TD region) would be presented aside panels (c) and (d).
#2.
Concerning the universal dilemma strength, the authors already cited two requisite literatures; one is the paper by Ito and another is by Wang. There is another work that gives the inception of the concept of Dg & Dr as below. It should be cited as well.
Tanimoto & Sagara; Relationship between dilemma occurrence and the existence of a weakly dominant strategy in a two-player symmetric game, BioSystems 90(1), 105-114, 2007. Decision letter (RSOS-190799.R0) 27-Aug-2019 Dear Professor Yoshimura:
Manuscript ID RSOS-190799 entitled "A single 'weight-lifting' game covers all kinds of games" which you submitted to Royal Society Open Science, has been reviewed. The comments from reviewers are included at the bottom of this letter.
In view of the criticisms of the reviewers, the manuscript has been rejected in its current form. However, a new manuscript may be submitted which takes into consideration these comments.
Please note that resubmitting your manuscript does not guarantee eventual acceptance, and that your resubmission will be subject to peer review before a decision is made.
You will be unable to make your revisions on the originally submitted version of your manuscript. Instead, revise your manuscript and upload the files via your author centre.
Once you have revised your manuscript, go to https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rsos and login to your Author Center. Click on "Manuscripts with Decisions," and then click on "Create a Resubmission" located next to the manuscript number. Then, follow the steps for resubmitting your manuscript.
Your resubmitted manuscript should be submitted by 24-Feb-2020 . If you are unable to submit by this date please contact the Editorial Office.
We look forward to receiving your resubmission. This paper proposes a 'weight-lifting' game where group benefits will be inextricably related with individual choices. The cooperative dilemma situation proposed here is interesting, however, what is the difference between the model here and the public goods game in essence? Especially the continuous public goods game or with threshold. Essentially, successful tasks will benefit all the individuals, and failed task will lead to individual damage. Moreover, more cooperators will bring more contributions, and thus the task will be more likely accomplished. From this point of view, where is the innovation of this work? In the modeling section, the authors need to discuss or design their model more fully. Moreover, more adequate theoretical analysis is required. Because of the introduction of further game parameters; f, fine that is levied to both players when lifting & carrying is failed, and p_0, p_1, and p_2; success probability of lifting & carrying respectively when two defectors, one defector & one cooperator, and two cooperators are paring in a game, the observed game structure becomes more complex. On quite important issue, unlike the conventional 2 by2 defined by payoff matrix; P, R, S and T, is that this particular game allows R < P. This is because D-dominant Trivial (they called TD) when Delta p_1 (:= p_1 -p_0) and Delta p_2 (:= p_2 -p_1) are both sufficiently small. As long as R > P is ensured as in the conventional 2 by 2 games, the game becomes either PD, Chicken, SH or Trivial digressing from the conventional D & R game (that belongs to PD as I said). All of those points are visually summarized in Fig. 3 , which looks quite intelligible and impressive. It immediately teaches that the region of TD (violet) withers when the dilemma strength becomes weak (b/c increasing). This entails the region of PD (blue) also shrinking and that of Trivial (yellow) swelling. It seems quite conservable.
Tanimoto & Sagara; Relationship between dilemma occurrence and the existence of a weakly dominant strategy in a two-player symmetric game, BioSystems 90(1), 105-114, 2007. Author's Response to Decision Letter for (RSOS-190799.R0) See Appendix A.
RSOS-191602.R0
Review form: Reviewer 1
Is the manuscript scientifically sound in its present form? Yes

Are the interpretations and conclusions justified by the results? Yes
Is the language acceptable? Yes
Do you have any ethical concerns with this paper? No
Have you any concerns about statistical analyses in this paper? No
Recommendation? Accept as is
Comments to the Author(s) I think the authors has addressed all the comments of the reviewers. I support it to be published in this version.
Review form: Reviewer 2
Is the manuscript scientifically sound in its present form? Yes
Are the interpretations and conclusions justified by the results? Yes
Is the language acceptable? Yes
Do you have any ethical concerns with this paper? No
Have you any concerns about statistical analyses in this paper? No
Recommendation? Accept as is
Comments to the Author(s)
The revised MS, sufficiently improved, seems enough to be published as it is.
Decision letter (RSOS-191602.R0)
23-Oct-2019
Dear Professor Yoshimura, I am pleased to inform you that your manuscript entitled "A single 'weight-lifting' game covers all kinds of games" is now accepted for publication in Royal Society Open Science.
You can expect to receive a proof of your article in the near future. To help expedite this process, we ask that you please send us the individual source file of each figure within your manuscript (high quality PDF or EPS files preferred) to: openscience@royalsociety.org Please contact the editorial office (openscience_proofs@royalsociety.org and openscience@royalsociety.org) to let us know if you are likely to be away from e-mail contact --if you are going to be away, please nominate a co-author (if available) to manage the proofing process, and ensure they are copied into your email to the journal.
Due to rapid publication and an extremely tight schedule, if comments are not received, your paper may experience a delay in publication.
Royal Society Open Science operates under a continuous publication model (http://bit.ly/cpFAQ). Your article will be published straight into the next open issue and this will be the final version of the paper. As such, it can be cited immediately by other researchers. As the issue version of your paper will be the only version to be published I would advise you to check your proofs thoroughly as changes cannot be made once the paper is published.
You have the opportunity to archive your accepted, unbranded manuscript, but access to the full text must be embargoed until publication.
Articles are normally press released. For this to be effective we set an embargo on news coverage corresponding to the publication date of the article. We request that news media and the authors do not publish stories ahead of this embargo (when final version of the article is available). Essentially, successful tasks will benefit all the individuals, and failed task will lead to individual damage. Moreover, more cooperators will bring more contributions, and thus the task will be more likely accomplished. From this point of view, where is the innovation of this work? In the modeling section, the authors need to discuss or design their model more fully. Moreover, more adequate theoretical analysis is required.
RESPONSE:
We are bit surprised with this review. The reason is this. We showed with mathematical proof that the proposed game covers all kinds of pairwise games, not only Prisoner's dilemma game, but also chicken game (e.g., hawk dove game) and stag hunt game. The public goods game is known to be the multiplayer version of prisoner's dilemma game. It does not belong to chicken game, nor stag hunt game. This reviewer may not know this fact and believe that public goods game is the multiplayer version of all types of pairwise games. Unfortunately we were not careful enough to mention that the public goods game is just a particular case of our proposed game. We thought that it is well known that the PD games is a two-player version of public goods game, for example see below. Abstract: Game theory has been studied extensively in various fields of science. The major question addressed here is why cooperation is promoted in various societies, including human and animal societies. To solve this question, the prisoner's dilemma (PD) and hawk-dove game, which is a type of chicken game (CH), are often used in these studies. A canonical approach is to investigate the pairwise game, in which two players choose either cooperation (C) or defection (D). Based on the dilemma structure, all pairwise games are classified/categorized into five games: (1) three types of dilemma games, PD, CH and the stag hunt game (SH) and (2) two trivial games, all C (trivial C: TC) and all D (trivial D: TD). The problem of cooperation has been investigated in these games separately following the specific scenario of each. No single game, however, can cover all five categories. Here, we propose a new game that covers all five game categories: the weight-lifting game. The player choose either to (1) carry a weight (pay cooperation cost; C) or (2) pretend to carry it (pay no cost; D). The probability of success in carrying the weight depends on the number of cooperators, and the players either gain the success reward or pay the failure penalty. All five game categories appear in this game depending on the success probabilities for the number of cooperators. We prove that this game is exactly equivalent to the combination of all five games in terms of a payoff matrix. We also discuss its extension to N-person games. Manuscript ID RSOS-190799 entitled "A single 'weight-lifting' game covers all kinds of games" which you submitted to Royal Society Open Science, has been reviewed.
